Optimizely snippet hijack: 178 sites served card-skimming code

by | Nov 17, 2026 | Tutorials | 0 comments

An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation to inject malicious JavaScript into the scripts that customer websites load from the vendor. The code was built to swap crypto wallet addresses and capture card details, and it reached visitors of at least 178 organisations, including CNN, the BBC and Zoom, according to Report URI, the firm that monitors the scripts sites run.

Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed. Its incident notice, posted at 01:02 UTC, does not explain how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, when the fix landed, whether the attacker still has access, or what customers should do. That gap is why the third-party analysis matters more than the vendor statement here.

What happened, in order

Time (UTC) Event
Mon 04:21 First injection seen, in the BBC’s snippet
Mon 13:43 Card skimmer added to the payload
Mon 17:13–17:57 Coruna exploit iframe added for iOS 18.6 and earlier
Mon ~19:25 Attacker wallets hold about $7,040, roughly nine hours in
Mon ~20:40 Mass cleanup begins; by 21:52 only TalkTalk’s snippet still carried the code
Tue 01:02 Optimizely posts its incident notice

Why a trusted CDN did not help

Optimizely’s snippet is a small script a site loads to run experiments. It updates itself when the customer changes a setting, and on every load it executes a block of custom code called Project JavaScript. The attacker wrote a loader into that block and left the rest of the snippet alone. The file still came from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s own certificate, so browsers had no reason to object. Sites that serve the snippet from their own domain were affected too, because the content still originates from the same project.

Report URI checked 1,611 snippets and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. The real number is probably higher: it could only inspect the snippets it found in time. The list includes Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely’s own main site and login page also carried the code.

The loader shipped in three variants to survive blocking: one loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js directly, one hid the domain in base64 so a text search would miss it, and one carried a full copy of the payload to run if the domain was unreachable.

What the payload did

  • Wallet swapping. It replaced valid crypto addresses with the attacker’s in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests. It only swapped an address that passed its chain’s checksum and sat near a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send.
  • Card skimming. Added at 13:43 UTC, it captured card number, expiry and CVV from the site’s own form fields and sent them to the attacker’s server.
  • Exfiltration. Cookies and a page screenshot were sent only after an address swap near wallet or payment wording.

Two limits matter for anyone assessing exposure. The skimmer cannot read cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe such as Stripe’s hosted fields or Adyen’s, and it cannot read cookies flagged HttpOnly. If your checkout already uses a provider-hosted iframe, the card exposure is much narrower than the headline implies.

The iOS second stage

On iPhones and iPads the code loaded boot.js from two .icu domains, read the iOS version, and opened an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna for iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1, DarkSword for iOS 18.4 to 18.7, and a third chain for iOS 26 that so far only collects device details. Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC the attacker added a Coruna iframe for every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier, and those pages reload every 60 seconds to retry, which a visitor could notice. Cynet retrieved the stage with an emulated browser and describes conditional delivery, not a confirmed compromise of a physical device.

The money

Report URI counted about $7,040 in the attacker’s wallets by 19:25 UTC; StepSecurity put the same addresses at about $6,600. Two of those addresses were in use before the injections began, so not all of the balance is attributable to this campaign.

What site owners should check now

  1. Open Project JavaScript in every Optimizely project and the custom code in every experiment. Search for 1688360, atob(, and any script you did not write.
  2. Review who and what can write to the account, then rotate user credentials, API tokens and integrations.
  3. If your own forms take card details, treat cards entered on Monday 16 November as possibly exposed.
  4. Rotate session tokens and any secret stored in a cookie without HttpOnly.
  5. Deploy a Content Security Policy with strict script-src and connect-src. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com does not help, because the code came from that host; strict-dynamic and unsafe-eval weaken the policy further.
  6. Fetch every snippet you serve, search it for the indicators, and record its Last-Modified header. Ask Optimizely which project IDs changed, and when.
  7. Search logs back to 08:00 UTC on Monday, and consider telling customers your site served them the code.
  8. Keep third-party tags off checkout pages entirely.

What visitors should do

  • Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
  • Compare any crypto payment made on Monday with the address you intended to pay. If they differ, assume a swap.
  • Check card statements for charges you do not recognise, and replace any card entered on an affected site that day.
  • Verify addresses on a hardware wallet’s own screen rather than against copied text.

Why this one matters

Every marketing tag on a page is code with the same privileges as your application. A/B testing, analytics, chat widgets and heatmaps all execute in the customer’s browser, and all of them can be changed without a deploy. The lesson is not “remove Optimizely”. It is that a vendor’s CDN is a trust boundary you do not control, and the only durable defences are least privilege on who can write to those accounts, a strict CSP, and keeping payment fields in an iframe your provider controls.

Cynet explicitly advises against broadly blocking cdn.optimizely.com or the affected news sites: delivering the code does not mean the site’s own systems were compromised.

Frequently asked questions

Was my site hacked? Not necessarily. If your snippet carried the loader, your Optimizely project was modified; that is different from your server being compromised. Check your own logs and the project code before you notify anyone.

Is the code still live? Optimizely says it removed it and the mass cleanup finished on Monday night. A snippet that is clean now may still have served the code during the window, so check Last-Modified and logs rather than current state alone.

Does a CSP fix this? A strict CSP limits what injected code can do, but it is not a cure: if you allow the vendor host, you allow the vendor’s content. The stronger control is limiting who can write to the vendor account.

Sources: The Hacker News, “Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimming Code” (17 November 2026), reporting analysis by Report URI, Cynet and StepSecurity, plus Optimizely’s incident notice of 01:02 UTC.

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