FastUnlock: an unpatched Windows 0-day that runs programs from the lock screen

by | Nov 20, 2026 | Tutorials | 0 comments

A researcher has published an unpatched technique called FastUnlock that lets someone with physical access to a locked Windows computer start programs without signing in. ThreatLocker tested it the same day and confirmed it works. There is no Microsoft fix yet, and there is no evidence it has been used in a real attack.

What it actually gets an attacker

The account it lands in is not an administrator. In ThreatLocker’s test, the firm reached the point where it could run a program from the lock screen inside a limited account it identifies as WSIAccount, and it states plainly that this is not an administrator account.

That distinction is the whole story. This is not privilege escalation to SYSTEM, and it is not a way to walk off with an encrypted disk. It is a way to execute code on a machine that is sitting there locked, in front of whoever is holding it.

How it works

FastUnlock depends on three things lining up: physical access to the device, a Microsoft account reachable through the lock screen’s recovery options, and Windows’ built-in screen reader, Narrator, which the technique uses to navigate the locked screen.

The researcher, posting under the handles MSNightmare and Nightmare Eclipse, disclosed it on GitHub with a video and very little written detail. That matters for how much weight to put on any single description: the clearest account of behaviour comes from ThreatLocker’s independent test, not from the disclosure itself.

Why BitLocker does not save you here

Most of the instinctive reassurance around a stolen laptop is BitLocker. In the common configuration, that reassurance is thinner than it feels. When the drive is protected by a TPM and no startup PIN, the chip releases the volume key automatically at boot. By the time the lock screen is up, the filesystem is already mounted and readable. The bypass runs at exactly that point.

FastUnlock does not break the encryption and does not recover the key. It does not need to. It works on a machine that has already unlocked its own drive in the normal way, which is a smaller problem than cracking an encrypted disk, and still a real one when the disk is in someone else’s hands.

What to do while there is no patch

  • Add a startup PIN to BitLocker. On sensitive machines, require a PIN at boot instead of letting the TPM unlock the drive silently. A startup PIN protects a machine that has not started yet.
  • Shut down or hibernate. A machine that is off is not sitting on a lock screen. Sleep is the state that leaves this window open.
  • Treat physical access as the control. Laptops that travel, shared desks, reception and front-counter machines that a stranger can reach: lock them up or keep them in sight.
  • Do not count a locked screen as a security boundary. It was never a strong one, and right now it is a documented way to run code.
  • Watch for the advisory. No official list of affected Windows versions has been published, so treat any machine meeting the conditions above as potentially affected until one is.

The takeaway

Microsoft’s own countermeasures guidance already recommends a startup PIN and shutting machines down when the threat model includes determined, hands-on attackers. FastUnlock did not create that advice, it just made it worth following this week rather than eventually. The gap it exposes is not in BitLocker’s cryptography. It is in the assumption that a screen asking for a password means the machine underneath is not running anything.

Sources: The Hacker News, Security Affairs and SC Media coverage, ThreatLocker’s test, and the researcher’s GitHub disclosure.

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I’m a System Administrator and a developer with 10+ years of experience.